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Soviet Discursive Power under Siege:  
Agitprop in the Blockade of Leningrad
In wartime, a crucial state goal is mobilizing civilians to 
sacrifice for the war effort and to feel a sense of loyalty to state 
and nation, and (hopefully) by extension to relevant elites. All 
talk and efforts for creating a loyal subject of a nation (or other 
political entity) are put to the test in war: at this moment, elites 
rely on non-elites to give effort and even lives, their own or loved 
ones, to defend the polity or to conquer in the name of national 
glory and status. As such, we expect efforts to shape discourses 
and symbols to increase in quantity and quality, painting the 
enemy as subhuman, as evil or a joke, in the hopes that this will 
overcome doubts or criticisms of one’s elite and encourage 
investing in a collective wartime endeavor. In the modern era, 
especially since World War I, making war and making propaganda 
have gone hand-in-hand.
Different scholars and theoretical camps agree that control 
over symbols and discourses is one dimension of power, related 
to but not reducible to control of material resources.1 One 
formal means of shaping universes of symbols and discourses 
is through agitation and propaganda (agitprop): the creation 
and dissemination of messages and meanings through various 
channels of communication, in particular through those controlled 
or influenced by the state. At best, agitprop can shape the 
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accepted meanings and ideologies of target populations—this is the usual assumption 
of the goal and effect of agitation and propaganda. Yet even if agitprop does not entirely 
shape thinking of a population, its real force might be crowding out alternatives from 
fields of discourses, thus depriving a target audience of sufficient arguments, claims, and 
evidence to form and articulate coherent disbelief or alternatives to existing authority. 
As one strategy for the second dimension of power (control of discourse and agendas), 
propaganda might alter people’s thoughts less by convincing them to buy into a position, 
than by leaving them no other choices and even making them think that different or 
dissenting positions might not be shared by others.
Before sociologists and political scientists expanded theories of power to give 
discourse and culture independent power dynamics, the Bolsheviks understood the 
importance of agitprop as one lever of power. Propaganda in the Soviet Union was 
ubiquitous, such that Peter Kenez dubbed the USSR a “propaganda state.”2 Conducting 
agitation and propaganda was one central task of the Communist Party, a strategy 
of persuasion complementing punitive functions of the NKVD and police. Of course, 
agitprop ubiquity did not automatically translate into effective persuasion. Creating homo 
sovieticus might have involved subtraction more than addition: not only promoting homo 
sovieticus, but also preventing or removing possible alternatives as immoral, backward, 
or illegal. While the Terror and consistent economic challenges might have hindered 
effectiveness and messages of propaganda before the war, this does not mean it did 
not influence frames of interpretation. If local experiences contributed to coding Soviet 
socialism and Soviet power, broader media—movies, newspapers, leaders’ speeches and 
writings—provided signals and codes for public behavior and repertoires of categories 
and methods for making sense of local experiences and possibly making claims. Further, 
local agitprop practices, such as lectures or small group meetings, provided a venue 
for civilians to question authorities, even if obliquely.
Not that agitprop always worked smoothly.3 The quality of agitprop cadres could 
matter for the effectiveness of discursive control; but sometimes the messages and 
materials they were given were not up to the task. Even before the war, agitprop faced 
challenges balancing regime claims and everyday realities. In 1938, the Leningrad 
apparatus of the Party set out to improve political work, beginning with cadre quality. 
If agitators and propagandists appeared unable or uncomfortable framing issues of 
the day, civilians might not take the Party and ideology seriously. By 1940, there were 
approximately 60,000 agitprop cadres working on press material or giving lectures 
at Leningrad's clubs, factories, and palaces of culture. Stalin’s Short Course was the 
centerpiece for a unified message (in theory).4 Just in time, too, for the going was 
about to get rough: On June 26, 1940, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet passed its 
infamous decree to increase labor discipline through draconian punishments for even 
the smallest infractions, such as being twenty minutes late for work regardless of cause. 
Agitators went to shopfloors and spent more time discussing the decree and labor 
discipline than the Short Course. Yet agitation and propaganda did not calm workers. 
Using the regime’s language of class enemies, some called the decree “sabotage” 
[predatel’skii] and “wrecking” [vreditel’skii].5 Aleksei Kuznetsov eventually went to some 
factory meetings to warn directors against being too strict when applying the new law.6 
At shopfloor meetings, workers asked questions about deficits of household goods or 
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real meanings of such slogans as “catching up with and overtaking capitalist countries.” 
That lecturers could not always answer these questions did not inspire confidence or 
respect.7 On the eve of war, one report to the Party bureau for the Trade Administration 
in Leningrad noted that newly-recruited cadres were skipping required military training, 
needed to improve their level of “culture” (i.e. theoretical knowledge), and were spending 
too much time on “cultural” and not “productive” (work-related) agitprop.8
Unsurprisingly, the sudden outbreak of World War II, the rapid retreat of the Red 
Army, and the suffering of soldiers and civilians despite earlier claims that the Soviet 
state could protect them challenged all of this, leading one to wonder why the authorities 
even bothered with much agitation and propaganda beyond the basics of supporting 
the leadership. One extreme case of the shock and suffering of war was the Blockade 
of Leningrad, where the 872-day siege led to mass death as well as suffering and 
created a new world of survival tactics and expedient policies9. Finding or producing and 
distributing scarce food and maintain social order were prime concerns of the Leningrad 
leadership10; for civilians, surviving meant adopting innovations in everyday practice, from 
trading at the rynok or stealing food to devising new forms of “food.” It might seem that 
under such circumstances, discourses and symbols would be relegated to low status 
in regime policies and civilian consciousness. Yet agitprop remained important, even 
as the Germans refused to cooperate with the usual Soviet interpretation of events.
Challenges of Crafting and Transmitting the Blockade Message
To those pre-war challenges, the Blockade added new obstacles to imposing a 
new set of relevant symbols and meanings that would mobilize civilian practices and 
dispositions. The first challenge was having a medium to deliver this discourse in the first 
place, but material challenges played their role. Agitation and propaganda efforts faced 
the same difficulties as any other endeavor in Leningrad, especially in the first winter. Like 
industrial workers or even members of the police and NKVD, agitprop cadres were not 
immune to hunger and cold; the materials for producing newspapers and leaflets were 
no easier to find than other material inputs in the blockaded city. Hungry lecturers might 
not be able to give their own lectures or attend discussion hours because of weakness 
or illness. Even if they could attend, civilians might be stuck at work, too hungry or ill to 
attend, or did not want to go out of their way to sit in a cold room to listen to a lecture 
when there were other more important issues of survival to attend to (e.g. stand in line 
for bread or seek additional food at the rynok). And rooms were cold or ill-lit: what little 
electricity and heating there was could not be spared from the factories that produced 
armaments or food. As Anton Plotkin noted in a 1946 discussion with a Party interviewer, 
agitation and propaganda in the first months of the war and Blockade was far from as 
effective as it should have been, but there were reasons why this was so. Everyone was 
hungry, which meant fewer lecturers and attendees for lectures. Constant air raids 
required that people congregate in shelters rather than lecture halls. Many Party members 
and leaders had volunteered for the Red Army, and the new leaders and propaganda 
cadres taking their places were less experienced and organized—thus, their work was 
less disciplined and less effective. This conspiracy of disruptions reduced the quality 
and quantity of work in agitation and propaganda, at least at the Bolshevik factory.11 
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In the first three months of 1942 there were too few public places with heat and light, 
reducing the number of civilians who bothered to come to lectures and discussions,12 
and holding lectures or conversations was impossible during air raids and moments of 
artillery bombardments anyway or when people were supposed to be at work or MPVO 
and other military posts and duties.13 Putting together and delivering propaganda lectures 
required energy and organizational effort, but “sometimes neither organizers nor lecturers 
had enough [energy]” to pull these off. For example, a scheduled lecture on Africa had 
an audience of listeners, but because the trams were not running, the lecturer could 
not make his own lecture. In another instance, agitators could not show a film because 
electricity for the room went out. One woman tried five times to give her lecture, but air 
raid sirens and an artillery bombardment and the lack of light ultimately forced her to 
cancel it. Another lecturer and audience were ready to go at one location—except the 
supervisor was in a long line for food and did not come to let them in.14
The second challenge was delivering these messages in a competent and convincing 
manner, which in turn depended on the quality of cadres and of messages and materials 
at their disposal. This meant fitting the message both with the needs of the regime and 
with the reality Leningraders faced. Explaining how the Germans had suddenly gone from 
being friends to the most hated of enemies was a problem, although available archival 
material suggests that this was not brought up openly. It seems the Party’s propaganda 
division preferred not to talk about such a policy blunder at all. Instead, agitators were 
supposed to tell workers what they had to pay attention to in newspapers.15 This points 
to one propaganda strategy: diverting attention or keeping potentially distressing or 
damaging facts or stories out of public discourse. Censors worked not only to keep 
sensitive military information out of circulation. They also worked to keep out anything 
that did not fit with the accepted narrative or could challenge that narrative. Unfortunately, 
much information on censorship was lost or destroyed in the first Blockade winter, but 
some materials survived. One internal circular tacked onto a general decree from June 
23, 1941 listed what materials and information could not be published: information on 
the location of airfields or changes in the officer corps, information on partisan activity 
and the movement of naval vessels, information on military tactics, or information on 
air raids (the quantity of bombs and where they fell, or how air raids disrupted everyday 
life).16 Economic information that could not be published included Plan targets and related 
data, data on the defense industry, details of evacuations (except for schools), and data 
about the supply of food—although “it is allowable to write about facts on the bad work 
of individual persons of trade and supply organizations.”17 Another surviving fragment 
on censorship showed concrete examples of mistakes in newspapers and required 
corrections to go along with the new Party line. The table below provides some examples:
Some corrections were political, such as the nature of the war. Stalin was courting 
capitalist allies, and framing the war as a struggle between socialism and capitalism 
would not do. In other newspapers besides those listed here, censors demanded 
removal of the claim that the war was for global socialism. Even in the first half of July, 
newspaper writers and editors continued to articulate this interpretation, and censors had 
to keep calling them out on the change in the new Party line.18 Not only did censorship 
apply to dissemination of concrete types of information; even the language to be used 
publicly was under the censors’ watchful eyes. Internal orders decreed in autumn 1941
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Censors’ corrections to newspaper material, late June 194119
Comment or problematic text Corrections demanded by censors
Elektrosila  40, June 23, 1941
Misunderstanding of the nature of the war
Remove a sentence on how the war is between 
socialism and capitalism.
Zhdanovets  34, June 24, 1941
In the current international context, such 
convictions of England are harmful and 
mistaken
Take out the sentence on how England is trying 
to destroy Soviet power
Sovietskii obektiv  47, June 27, 1941
To speak of a struggle with capitalism overall 
is politically mistaken, the struggle is with a 
miscarriage of capitalism, German fascism
In the article “Fascism will break its own head,” 
take out this line, “The war started by the 
will of imperialists will be the decisive battle 
between socialism and capitalism.”
Sovietskii obektiv  47, June 27, 1941
Entirely incorrect slogan flowing from a 
misunderstanding of the nature of the war
In the article “The triple blow for blow,” take 
out the slogan “Long live the German Soviet 
Republic”
Avangard  23, June 26, 1941
Article entirely harmful and incorrect 
Take out the article “”For the cultured 
dormitory” that describes how filth and 
unpleasantness of one dormitory reminds one of 
the tsarist regime
Avangard  26, June 25, 1941
Misunderstanding of the war
Remove the line stating, “This war will be 
a continuation of the great October socialist 
revolution, the final goal of which will flow out 
into world revolution.
Avtodvigatel  24, June 23, 1941
Entirely harmful feuilleton oriented to creating 
a panic among the population
Cut out the feuilleton “Two pounds of flour” 
that describes how the head of the supply 
department cannot find two pounds of flour 
anywhere for pasting the Komsomol committee 
room
Krasnyi tramvaishchik  21, June 14, 1941
No reason given
Remove material on blaming hooliganism at 
work, which the newspaper simply reports 
without assigning blame
“Hiterlites” (gitlerovtsy) be used instead of “Nazis” (natsisty), and that the “Soviet-German 
Front” be used instead of “Eastern Front”—the former stressing an individual over a 
broader movement (thus demonizing the leader but potentially reducing the culpability 
of the mass of Germans), and the latter signaling a stress on Soviet effort rather than 
joint effort with the Allies. Also, formal news could not write about women being “drafted” 
in the army; instead, women “volunteered” for service.20 Other stories risked creating 
worry or worsening morale, such as the story above of the official unable to find flour 
(from Avtodvigatel on June 23).
Agitators and propagandists always had the periodical Propaganda i agitatsiia 
as one resource. So important was propaganda that special journals—Bolshevik, 
Partstroitelstvo, Propagandist, Sputnik agitator, Komintern, and others—were shipped 
in from Moscow, across Lake Ladoga—journals taking up space that could have been 
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used for food.21 The content reflects what we might expect from Stalin’s era. Leading 
articles for the February 1942 issue of Propaganda i agitatsiia included “Lenin and 
Stalin—supreme leaders [vozhdi] and organizers of the Red Army,” “Where there is 
Stalin, there is victory” (a history of Stalin’s achievements in the Civil War), “Defense of 
the Motherland is the highest law of our life,” and heroic stories of snipers, pilots, and 
partisans (including one article entitled “For the Motherland! For Stalin!”).22 The March 
1942 issue was critical of agitprop work—agitators did not always feel they had support 
of Party cells, and various agitation points in homes had been closed for some odd 
reason. That issue also offered heroic stories and tips for keeping homes clean, which 
agitators were supposed to share with civilians.23 Poems by Pushkin and Lermontov were 
sometimes included,24 as were data on production in the USSR and the United States.25 
One article from summer 1942, entitled “To nurture hatred for the enemy,”26 stressed the 
role of propaganda for maintaining morale and noted that agitators and propagandists 
were not driving home Stalin’s warning that difficult times still lie ahead. Maintaining 
morale and a will to victory required inculcating hatred for the “enemy” (even though 
this clearly mean the Germans), and the primary goal of propaganda was “nurturing 
hatred for the enemy, such hatred that will lead a person to seek out the enemy, to find 
all means and possibilities to annihilate the enemy, to give everything of himself without 
letting up on defeating the enemy. That hatred for the enemy is the central thread in 
the life of every Soviet person, eclipsing everything else, must be achieved.”27 Using 
examples of German atrocities was one tool to inculcate such hatred, for example stories 
of starvation in occupied territories.28
New slogans in summer 1942 expressed the Germans’ concrete atrocities, provided 
sharp criticism of Hitler, and reveled in the heroic exploits of the Red Army. Of course, 
there was still work to do among the civilian population, in particular improving discipline 
and rooting out deserters who had tried to blend into the urban landscape.29 Local 
agitprop departments did take the new Party lines and advice from above seriously, as 
minutes from a July 1942 meeting of the agitprop department of the Oktiabr’skii district 
Party raikom for the reveal. While 1942 would be the year to beat the Germans, agitprop 
cadres still had to be careful about framing the path to victory and related world events. 
If the message was that the anti-Hitler coalition is strong, then workers might become 
complacent. On the other hand, to say that the Germans were progressing through Soviet 
territory (e.g. as on the way to Stalingrad) might be an incentive for workers to improve 
their discipline.30 To help with this war effort, agitprop efforts would also be directed at 
encouraging those not necessary to military production to evacuate out of Leningrad, 
and that doing so did not compromise their patriotism.31 And of course, whipping up 
hatred for Germans was a must. Telling of German atrocities was a normal component 
of this message and effort, but it was not enough. Just to say “I hate the Germans” was 
not enough, because one could claim to hate Germans but still show up late for work 
or work badly. Leningraders’ discipline and effort had to be driven by hatred. Thus, the 
new policy was to question civilian hatred: if someone said “I hate the Germans,” the 
appropriate response was to say “I don’t believe you” and to demand concrete actions 
for the war effort as proof of real hatred. “Our hatred must be measured by material 
deeds,” was the claim—hatred had to be instantiated as practice, not just empty words.32 
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Propaganda i agitatsiia could provide ideas and materials, but these risked being 
too broad and general to have sufficient emotional or personal impact on suffering 
Leningraders. Shaping or aligning civilian perceptions, identities, and interests required 
somehow affecting their senses of attachment and empathy—if possible, playing on 
significant anchors and other symbols and objects of meaning that were or had been 
part of civilians’ myriad fields. Given how many civilians’ (usually male) family and friends 
were serving in the Red Army at the Leningrad front, framing civilian-military relations in 
personal terms, and from there inculcating collective patriotism, was too tempting and 
important a strategy to pass up.33 Civilians and soldiers listened regularly to the radio, 
and so this became an important medium for delivering this civilian-military discourse. 
One regular radio program was “Letters to and from the front,” in which radio announcers 
would read letters wither from soldiers to family and friends behind the lines, or from 
family, friends, and co-workers to their comrades at the front lines. How many of these 
letters were real is impossible to determine from available data—only the typed transcripts 
of what was read on the radio are available in the relevant archive (TsGALI SPb).
A complementary strategy was to arrange for civilians to visit soldiers or to send 
them such gifts as socks, scarves, pencils, and other useful items. Party-organized 
worker committees would collected and send presents to the front, and sometimes 
groups of workers would travel to the front lines to give them personally, as well as to relay 
news. (Sometimes Leningrad women would travel to the front to sing or put on shows for 
soldiers, much as many did in hospitals for the wounded.) As early as November 1941, 
Party leaders were organizing groups of worker representatives to visit the front lines. 
These groups were not only supposed to reinforce relations between the front and the 
rear; they were also reconnaissance missions of sorts, to learn the mood of the troops, 
who might speak more openly to civilians than to superiors. Upon returning from the 
front, Party cadres often debriefed these workers’ groups—only to discover that not 
only were soldiers not always happy, but also that they were complaining to civilians. 
One group was supposed to visit the 55th army on November 4, although it turned out 
the delegation made it to the front on November 5 and was sent to a different division 
than originally intended. They claimed the soldiers were in a brave mood, and the worker 
representatives spent time meeting with the commissar (politruk) to discuss agitation 
and propaganda. Soldiers asked questions about international politics, how the Allies 
were helping on other fronts, and whether Leningrad was being bombed. Some also 
complained about slow deliveries of mail from friends and family. Others griped that 
they had to leave behind personal belongings but had not received receipts for them, 
and they were wondering whether their valuables were properly stored. They told worker 
representatives that they could use warm clothes and shoes. Another group, sent to 
division of the 8th army, discussed the situation in Leningrad with curious and concerned 
troops. Soldiers complained of having too little ammunition, shoes, and quality political 
education. There were not always enough shovels to dig trenches, and they were low on 
medicine.34 Another group, sent to the 20th division of the 5th army at Dubrovka, related 
that soldiers felt they were not receiving adequate news and quality discussions about 
politics of the war. Newspapers from November 7, which contained Stalin’s speech on 
the anniversary of the October Revolution, arrived late—finding a driver to transport 
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them was difficult—and those responsible for agitprop were not using their heads or 
were being “formal” about work (i.e. going through the motions).35
Maintaining Control of Discourse:  
Quality of Cadres and Behavior of Civilians
Officials heading agitprop were concerned about the quality of their messages, 
but not only to mobilize civilian emotions and actions in a way conducive to state power 
and the war effort. Archival documents suggest that agitprop cadres were at least as 
interested in their performance and image vis-à-vis Party and state leadership. In fact, the 
majority of agitprop documents in the former Leningrad Party archive in St. Petersburg 
are not the content of lectures or posters. Instead, they were reports about progress 
and quality of agitation and propaganda—in the spirit of samokritika, criticisms of and 
reflections upon the state of the propaganda machine and its content in the besieged city. 
While Leningraders were trying to survive, and in the process creating their own meaning 
to life and society, propagandists were trying to create their own normality—not just of 
regime, state, and society, but of themselves in the war effort and their position and status 
inside fields of power, in a situation where they might be less significant than soldiers, 
state and Party elite, producers and distributors of food, and the security services. In 
short, agitprop cadres and departments might have felt a threat to their raison d’être, 
and archival materials about the internal politics of agitation and propaganda reveal an 
institutional inferiority complex. For example, in March 1942, leaders of the October 
district Party cell for the Trade Administration criticized comrades for irregularities in 
the appearance of well newspapers (stengazety). The editor responded that other 
communists were not pulling their weight. The Party bureau chair ordered member 
Mariia Martynovskaia to help with various tasks.36 In May wall newspapers remained a 
central issue for bureau discussions afterwards, although the editor complained that 
she was working alone and that other Party members were not helping post stengazety 
throughout the district.37 The lack of manpower was again the central problem, except 
that here, as elsewhere, policies were not adjusted to fit a physical reality of real people 
exhausted by hunger.
If agitators and propagandists believed in their work and messages they were 
delivering, it could add to the effectiveness of propaganda: as enough teachers (hopefully) 
know, one tool for effective teaching is to be passionate about the subject and to know 
the content. We do not have many diaries from propagandists, and some come across 
as highly formulaic, as if the writer was mimicking what he or she was also delivering to 
audiences. Yet some appear more sincere. For example, in 1984 Ivan Balin recorded his 
reminiscences about propaganda work in the Leningrad Party to address those “living 
in the remarkable conditions of developed socialism, some of whom have skepticism” 
and hopefully to reduce some of the “anger and egoism” that worried him in the 1980s. 
Born to poor peasants and joining the Komsomol and “Lenin’s Party,” he eventually 
came to Leningrad to help speed up collectivization outside the city. During the war 
he carried out ideological work in an army unit while his wife and son remained hungry 
and ill in Leningrad. So important was propaganda and agitation work to his personal 
history that his basic comment on the Blockade—and by extension, about his family’s 
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sufferings—was that one day his son cried as he ate bread, and that he himself “could 
not comfort them in any way.”38
Maintaining a consistent message—propagating a few basic signals to shape 
civilians’ trajectories of thought and behavior—was no easy task, as one report about 
propaganda and agitation work in the Kirov raion for the first half of 1942 revealed. 
There was nearly no work from January to March 1942, although with the spring this 
agitprop division returned to life. Despite hardships, however, agitprop cadres persisted 
in their work—and those hardships were not insignificant, as if war and Blockade were 
conspiring against the structuring of signals and discourse. Narrating the Blockade and 
war was a major challenge, as sequences of military news and events were anything 
but constant and did not fit a stylized picture of Soviet superiority vis-à-vis the decadent 
bourgeois West. Finding a plausible and useful message, and making sure all agitprop 
cadres articulated the same narrative and could field civilians’ questions, was a constant 
problem that Party officials blamed on “training” or “competence.” Not all agitators were 
up to the task to propagate the Party line as needed—either they were insufficiently 
educated or motivated.39 Training agitprop cadres, like training new communists, meant 
more than reading a newspaper, Stalin’s Short Course, or some other text. It required 
extended discussions to make sure that new entrants into the lower levels of field of 
power understood the logic and line of the state and Party and were able to defend and 
propagate it in the face of adverse events or civilians’ questions and confusion.40 These 
challenges bred yet another: the growing lack of such qualified personnel. This part of 
the field of power was being depopulated; without appropriate agents, constructing 
signals of normal symbols, meanings, and public practices became that much more 
difficult. Death and illness stemming mostly from winter hunger were the main reason 
for the dwindling number of available agitators and propagandists in the Kirov raion, 
and even the rise in the bread ration at the end of December 1941 could not stem the 
effects of starvation.
Despite such challenges, Kirov agitators and propagandists told a story of continuing 
dedication in face of hardships. In those first three difficult months of 1942, agitation 
and propaganda activities went on for celebrating Lenin’s death, the creation of the Red 
Army, and International Women’s Day, as well as for collecting clothing for the army and 
mobilizing civilians to clean their rooms and courtyards. Agitators tried to hold regular 
discussions with civilians at their places of residence, with overviews of the progress 
of the war, the state of the alliance with the United States and Great Britain, and news 
about the southern eliciting the most interest.41 “Nurturing hatred” of the enemy by giving 
lectures on the “essence of fascism” was a regular staple, and this included discussions 
of German atrocities against Soviet people in occupied territories.42 Agitprop cadres at 
one food factory reported their efforts maintaining morale and discipline. Not enough 
local residents were covering their windows (which normally would elicit a fine) or doing 
enough to help clean snow and filth from city streets. Cadres also had to uncover and 
counter rumors, such as claims that the real reason for the December 25, 1941 increase 
in the bread ration was because of mass death and fewer mouths consuming the same 
quantity of food. Discussion themes in general include news from the front, speeches 
by Molotov and other leaders, fascism, and hygiene.43 The main themes of discussion 
and mobilization at one “agitation point” in a local dormitory were evacuations (reasons 
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to evacuate and providing help), hygiene (accompanied by inspections of dorm rooms), 
helping the ill and weak, and cleaning the dormitory and surrounding area.44 Other lectures 
touched on complicated issues (e.g. the loss of Sevastopl’ in 1942 and what this might 
mean for Leningrad’s fate)45 or addressed the importance of vitamin C and what kinds 
of plants Leningraders could eat, heroic stories of partisans’ exploits behind enemy 
lines, and a possible “new order” in Europe following the demise of fascism (which one 
lecturer apparently hoped would take place in 1942).46
Even if agitprop bosses and cadres could improve the quality of the presentations 
and their contexts, this did not guarantee that the performance of guiding discourse 
would follow the script ideally. Controlling the topics of coverage in newspapers and 
agitation discussions, and bringing civilians and soldiers together, could go some way to 
imposing a particular narrative of the nature and conduct of the war, of the legitimacy of 
the regime’s policies, leadership, and qualities, and of normal civilian behavior. However, 
Soviet propaganda was not merely a one-way street of the regime’s agents talking and 
civilians listening. Rather, the Communist Party and Soviet state demanded that civilians 
participate in the enactment of those agitprop meanings coming. Before the war, this 
meant preparing for and participating in various celebrations, such as hanging up banners 
and marching in parades.47 For agitation lectures and similar meetings, while Party cadres 
would give speeches or lead discussions, the presumption was that the audience would 
go along by asking “proper” questions—a practice akin to what Stephen Kotkin called 
“speaking Bolshevik.”48 This gave audiences the opportunity to ask and write down 
questions for lecturers. While we should not be under any illusions that free speech as 
we know it was encouraged, workers and other civilians could use the regime’s own 
language to interrogate its cadres further—perhaps taking the ideology and the nation 
more seriously than cadres themselves. And in a situation such as the Blockade, when 
important information was vague and distant and transmitted by radio and newspaper, 
sometimes these agitprop lectures were opportunities to flesh out specifics or get some 
kinds of answers to important questions. 
Archives do not contain details for all questions asked at all lectures—record-
keeping was far from systemic—but some examples survived to give us a clue about the 
atmosphere of these moments when regime met subjects. Civilians’ questions to lecturers 
reveal an interest in geopolitics beyond scripts of Party and propaganda. Propaganda 
officials and activists conducted lectures as part of their usual routine; many were held 
in enterprises, others in general social settings like lecture halls or libraries. Following 
lectures (usually parroting the Party line of the time), lecturers invited questions from the 
audience. Some lecturers’ notes of those questions that survived reveal average workers 
whose curiosity of global politics—and their place in it—was fairly sophisticated, not only 
in terms of general knowledge but also about just how Soviet policies would mesh with 
those of allies. At one meeting between workers and agitprop cadres in late November 
1941, the majority of workers present publicly accepted that ration reductions were 
inevitable, and that if a daily bread ration of 150 grams was what was needed to defeat 
the Germans, then so be it. This was an example of speaking Bolshevik—following the 
script for “proper” discourse in an agitprop meeting. Maybe some even believed this. 
Yet they also asked questions that strayed beyond a quiescent script. One individual, 
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possibly an NKVD informant, included some questions in a svodka passed on to the 
Party hierarchy:
How long with this difficult food situation last?
What is Moscow’s situation, compared to that of Leningrad?
Will there be further reductions in rations for food and bread?
For how long will food reserves in the city last? Will supply improve once the blockade is broken?
Will strict control be established in stores and cafeterias, so that they did not mismeasure and 
reduce rations owed to the people?
Why did they let the Germans get so close to Leningrad and give them the chance to fortify their 
positions?49
The presence of such probing voiced publicly suggests that some workers 
were willing to hold some members of the state and Party to account. The practice of 
incorporating civilians into agitprop practices, and providing a template for discourse, 
provided civilians with some tools to hold these lowly members of the regime to account 
and to exercise a modicum of autonomy (such as it could be in Stalinist wartime)—
ironically, a logic antithetical to that of agitprop.
Agitprop at War: Lessons from the Blockade?
This essay provides only a quick glimpse into the routines of Blockade agitprop, 
and so extrapolating to bigger lessons about Soviet power and discourse at war comes 
with risks. Clearly and unsurprisingly, the suddenness and ferocity of the war and 
Blockade, as well as the uncertainty and deprivation, presented challenges not only 
to maintaining a clear and consistent message, but also to propagating any message 
at all. Even if agitprop cadres could hold lectures and discussions or put up banners 
and newspapers, the reality of hunger and German bombs could not be covered up 
or explained away by Marxist-Leninist dialectics. Even Stalin himself had to admit that 
victory would not come easily or without great cost. Agitprop did not seem particularly 
effective at inhibiting black markets in the speculative resale of stolen food (and led 
some Leningraders to ask about this publicly, as one question noted above clearly 
reveals). To the extent Leningraders felt hatred towards the Germans, this was due 
less to agitprop efforts than to Leningraders’ own experiences of hunger, air raids, and 
watching many others die. The Germans did a far better job mobilizing patriotism than 
any banner or speech could.
Not that any of this had a significant impact on broader agitprop logics and practices. 
The reality of war forced a shift in content of messages, but the juxtaposition of agitprop 
and reality raised the risk that the regime would lose credibility among civilians—which did 
happen on occasion, if rumors reported in svodki and diaries are reflect social reality.50 
Regimes at war do not shy away from propaganda, but adjustments to practices can be 
significant, for example in the United Kingdom in World War I and the United States in 
World War II. The war and Blockade posed challenges to agitprop, but basic routines and 
practices did not change except marginally. Apparently, agitprop was core to Bolshevik 
political culture and institutional practice. 
I conclude with a curious facet of the politics of propaganda that the Blockade’s 
stresses and challenges accentuated. Those challenges meant that agitprop did not 
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always work smoothly or have a desired result. The source of blame for such shortcomings 
might reveal something deeper about Bolshevik logics of perception and practice, and 
perhaps not only for agitprop. And archival materials of internal accounts and discussions 
about the quality of agitprop hint that there is something worth further investigation 
going on under the surface. When criticizing their subordinates’ efforts, higher-ups in the 
agitprop machine framed criticism and blame for shortcomings with the same logic by 
which Leningrad elites in the Military Council or elsewhere in the state and Party assigned 
blame for shortcomings in distribution of food, preparation of defensive fortifications, or 
production: the individual himself or herself was to blame. This was a theoretical irony 
for self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninists to locate shortcomings in individual psyches and 
effort, rather than in broader social structures. While this likely came in part from an 
attempt to save one’s skin by not directly blaming Bolshevism and its leaders (especially 
Stalin), the fact that this logic appears everywhere suggests that this was a logic more 
than a tactic of personal and political survival. Criticizing Stalin and Bolshevism were 
beyond the pale—but criticizing local structures, procedures, and collective habits could 
have worked, especially if one avoided criticizing Smolny and did criticized in the spirit 
of samokritika. Yet the persistence of blaming individual motivations and psychology 
suggests a real move away from the core logic of Marxism and even Leninism—namely, 
the centrality of structures and structural contradictions. In this sense, the political 
culture of Leningrad in the Blockade and the USSR at war might have been closer to the 
(somewhat real but also somewhat mythical) individualism of Anglo-American political 
culture—closer than either side would want to admit. The story of Blockade agitprop, 
possibly, might provide a glimpse into the soul of one of two partners in a fascinating 
and troubling relationship that was developing before and during the war and about to 
dominate international relations, and the fate of humanity, for the next fifty years.
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